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ABSTRACT 
 
Driver distraction is a significant risk factor for traffic crashes. Distraction from 
secondary tasks has been the basis of much research and legislation. However, the influence 
of cognitive distraction, or mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), on driver 
performance has not been as closely studied. The current study used a self-report method to 
capture the moment-to-moment off-task thoughts, and investigated the influence of mind 
wandering on behavior and performance in a simulated driving task. Participants performed 
a car-following task in a simulated low-traffic driving environment, and were asked to press 
a button mounted on the steering wheel any time they found themselves “zoning out”. 
Driving performance metrics and oculomotor scanning data were analyzed to compare 
driving behaviors and performance under attentive versus inattentive mental states. The 
results showed that mind wandering caused horizontal narrowing of drivers' visual scanning, 
shifts of lane position, and a decrease in the variability of vehicle velocity. Mind wandering 
influences driver performance in a way similar to distraction from secondary tasks (e.g., 
Recarte & Nunes, 2000, 2003). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Drivers contend with various sources of distraction (Hanowski, Perez, & Dingus, 
2005), including distractions from secondary tasks, such as telephone conversations, 
radio tuning, and navigation system interactions. Driver distraction is involved in an 
estimated 25 to 37 percent of traffic accidents (Sussman, Bishop, Madnick, & 
Walter, 1985; Wang, Knipling, & Goodman, 1996; Robertson, 2003), and causes 
approximately $50 billion social and economic costs annually (Stutts, Reinfurt, 
Staplin, & Rodgman, 2001).   
Accordingly, the effects of secondary-task on driving performance have been 
the focus of intense research. For example, Strayer and Johnston (2001) reported 
that a word-generation task compromised simulated driving performance, increasing 
error in a manual tracking task. In a set of on-road studies, Recarte and Nunes found 
that a verbal and spatial-imagery task caused spatial gaze concentration (Recarte & 
Nunes, 2000, 2003) and reduced the frequency of glances to the rear-view mirror 
and speedometer (Recarte & Nunes, 2000).  
However, driver distraction does not arise exclusively from secondary tasks. 
Emerging epidemiological and related laboratory research suggests that mind 
wandering, a form of purely mental distraction that does not require any manual or 
visual interaction with the external environment, might also compromise driver 
performance. In the Indiana Tri-Level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents 
(Treat et al., 1979), recognition failure was found to be involved in 56% of all crash 
cases analyzed. Among these cases, preoccupation with competing thoughts 
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accounted for 15% of recognition failure. Other work has found that drivers with 
poor performance (measured by tickets, accident citations, hospitalizations, injured 
in fall, and composite mishaps) scored higher in the Cognitive Failure Questionnaire, 
which measures the tendency of everyday cognitive failure (Larson, Alderton, 
Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Larson & Merritt, 1991). Another epidemiological 
study using a case-control design also found that drivers with higher accident risk 
tended to engage in cognitive activities, such as daydreaming or thinking about 
personal problems while driving (Violanti & Marshall, 1996). These findings imply 
that cognitive distraction independent of an explicit secondary task may have effects 
similar to secondary-task distraction.   
 
What’s mind wandering? 
Mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 
2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), is also referred to as an attention lapse 
(Carriere, Cheyne, Smilek, 2008), an absent-minded lapse (Schacter, 2001), a 
spontaneous cognitive event, daydreaming, stimulus-independent thought, intrusive 
thought (Antrobus, Singer & Greenberg, 1966; Gold & Reilly, 1985,1986; Klinger, 
1977; Klos & Singer, 1981), task unrelated thought (Smallwood, O'Connor, 
Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyn, 2004; Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 
2003), or spontaneous thought (Christoff, Ream, & Gabrieli, 2004). 
 Mind wandering, is a spontaneous mental state, in which executive attention is 
decoupled from current task and context (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008; Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 1970), 
 3 
 
and instead focuses on self-relevant concerns (Klinger, 1999, 2009). During mind 
wandering, analysis of events in the external environment was reduced (Smallwood, 
Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008), causing “failures in task performance and 
superficial representations of the external environment” (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). 
 
Mind wandering depends on central executive resources. 
Antrobus (1968) explained the production of mind wandering within the 
framework of an information processing model of cognition. A shared capacity-
limited central cognitive operator is in charge of processing information from 
external (visual, auditory, tactile etc. sensory modality) and internal (long-term 
memory) sources (Antrobus, 1968). Because all the concurrent tasks share a 
common and limited central cognitive operator, if the resources consumed by the 
primary external task decrease, an increased portion of cognitive resources would be 
devoted to the generation of mind wandering, allowing more frequent off-task 
thoughts (Antrobus, 1968; Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 1970; Teasdale, 
et al., 1995). As a test of this model, Antrobus (1968) measured the production of 
mind-wandering as a function of information presentation rate in a tone detection 
task. Results showed that the frequency of mind wandering was a negative linear 
function of signal presentation rate, supporting the hypothesis of a common central 
cognitive resource for sensory events and stimulus-independent thoughts. 
Baddeley’s working memory model (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) 
provided a more clear depiction of the cognitive mechanism of mind wandering. The 
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working memory model includes three modular components: a central executive, 
which supervises attentional control of actions, coordinates multiple tasks, and 
integrates information in the memory or sensory input; a visuospatial sketchpad, 
which stores visual images; and an articulatory and phonological loop, which stores 
sounds. The central executive corresponds to the common and limited central 
cognitive operator proposed by (Antrobus, 1968). Primary tasks and mind 
wandering compete for the central executive resources. If more resources are 
allocated to mind wandering, fewer resources are available for the primary tasks, 
resulting in performance decrements.  
Teasdale and colleagues investigated the role of working memory in generating 
stimulus independent thoughts, and found evidence that mind wandering depends on 
central executive resources (Teasdale, et al., 1995). Their study measured the 
frequency of mind wandering on unpracticed and practiced tasks, and found that 
practice in a dual verbal memory task and a perceptual motor skill task increased the 
frequency of mind wandering, an effect that could be explained by the reduction in 
central resource demands of the dual task after practice. Using a random number 
generation task, Teasdale and colleagues also found that the randomness of 
generated numbers decreased during periods of stimulus-independent thoughts, 
suggesting that the random number generation task and production of mind 
wandering compete for the central executive resource. They concluded that the 
production of mind wandering depended on central executive resources (Teasdale, et 
al., 1995).  
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Recent findings in neuroscience have also provided evidence that the central 
executive contributes to mind wandering. An fMRI study found that both the 
prefrontal default network and executive network regions were associated with 
subjective self-reports of mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & 
Schooler, 2009). Activation of default and executive network regions was even 
stronger when subjects were unaware of their off-task thinking. The involvement of 
executive network regions when mind wandering, including dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex, supplemented behavioral evidence for off-task 
thinking, and provided further support for the argument that the production of mind 
wandering requires central executive resources.  
 
Factors influencing mind wandering  
As noted above, task demand influences mind wandering frequency by 
modulating the allocation of central executive resources to external tasks (Forster & 
Lavie, 2009; Giambra, 1995; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003). Giambra 
(1995) varied task demand by manipulating stimulus presentation rate and target 
probability in a vigilance task. Higher target probability and shorter inter-stimulus 
intervals, both of which increase processing demand in the vigilance task, reduced 
mind wandering frequency. Similarly, Forster and Lavie (2009) found that high 
perceptual load in a visual-search task reduced the frequency of mind wandering. 
Based on experimental evidence that high signal presentation rate decreased mind 
wandering, Antrobus (1968) speculated that heavy highway traffic would reduce 
fantasy and task-irrelevant thought.  
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Besides, task skills and demand, other factors that may influence the 
generation of mind wandering are age (Giambra, 1989, 1993; Singer & Antrobus, 
1963, 1972), stress (e.g., Antrobus et al., 1967), circadian rhythm (Giambra, et al., 
1988–1989), and mood (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). 
 
Mind wandering and task performance   
Studies have demonstrated mind wandering induced performance losses in a 
variety of laboratory tasks, including signal detection (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), reading comprehension (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 
2005), vigilance (Giambra, 1995), and memory (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008). 
For example, in the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), Robertson et al. 
(1997) found that mind wandering was accompanied by an increase in response 
errors. Smallwood and colleagues later found that the amplitude of the P300 
component of the event related potential was reduced prior to the occurrence of 
behavioral (error on SART) and subjective (self-report of mental state) indicators of 
off-task thinking, further supporting the suggestion that processing in the SART is 
impaired during mind wandering (Smallwood, et al. , 2008).   
Despite the well-documented evidence for performance decrements, mind 
wanders may also promote task performance to some extent. According to Antrobus, 
people may intentionally engage in off-task thinking for various purposes, for 
example, to plan for future events, to relieve boredom, to entertain themselves, and 
to maintain arousal level when working in a monotonous environment, such as long 
drives and train voyage (Antrobus, Singer, Goldsein, & Fortgang, 1970). Antrobus 
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(1968) argued that “daydreaming and similar transformations on memory do not 
interrupt the response to sensory input, e.g. when driving a car”, and off-task 
thought, as undeliberate planning, is likely to be rewarded in improved performance 
in subsequent overt behaviors.  
 
The effect of mind wandering depends on meta-awareness 
The extent of performance decrement caused by mind wandering also 
depends on the mind wanderer’s awareness of his or her mental state (Smallwood, et 
al., 2007; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). Explicit awareness of mental 
contents, termed as meta-awareness, waxes and wanes from unawareness to direct 
monitoring of the wandering mind (Schooler, 2002; Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; 
Smallwood, et al., 2007). Using a thought-sampling technique, Smallwood, 
McSpadden and Schooler (2007) distinguished two types of mind wandering: tuning 
out, or mind wandering with meta-awareness of immediate mental contents, and 
zoning out, or mind wandering without meta-awareness of mental contents. In their 
study of target detection (detecting a target stimulus “XXXXX” among words) 
(Smallwood, et al., 2007), mind wandering without awareness was associated with 
brief reaction times and poor response inhibition, while mind wandering with 
awareness was associated with long reaction times, suggesting that meta-awareness 
of mind wandering mediates the consequences off-task thought. This conclusion was 
affirmed by a reading comprehension task (Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2008).  
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Mind wandering may impair driving performance 
 Ubiquitous as mind wandering is in our daily driving, whether mind wandering 
impairs driving performance is seldom studied and largely unknown. Except for 
several epidemiological and survey studies (Violanti & Marshall, 1996; Larson, 
Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Larson & Merritt, 1991), as far as we know, 
little empirical research has examined the mechanisms by which mind wandering 
interferes with driving performance. Nevertheless, the central executive explanation 
of mind wandering suggests that off-task thoughts would impair the performance of 
the driving-related tasks. Research in closely related areas may also shed light on 
mechanisms of driving performance impairment during mind wandering.  
 First, driving involves cognitive functions, such as, signal detection (e.g., detect 
turning traffic signals, watch out for darting pedestrians across the road) and 
vigilance (e.g., monitor dashboard). Existing studies have documented that task 
performance is degraded during mind wandering (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Giambra, 
1995). With worse signal detection ability and unsustainable attention focus, absent-
minded drivers should drive poorer than when they were attentive.  
Secondly, various secondary-task distractions analogous to mind wandering---
for example, working memory task (Alm & Nilsson, 1995; Briem & Hedman, 1995), 
mental arithmetic task (McKnight & McKnight, 1993), reasoning task (Brown, 
Tickner, & Simmonds, 1969), word generation task (Strayer & Johnston, 2001), 
visual and spatial imaginary task (Recarte & Nunes, 2000)---are known to impair 
driving performance. For example, Recarte and Nunes (2000) found that secondary 
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verbal and spatial-imagery tasks while driving caused the visual inspection window 
to shrink both horizontally and vertically, and increased the fixation duration in the 
spatial-imagery task. These tasks all load on central executive resources, as mind 
wandering does , suggesting that mind wandering may also impair driving 
performance and change eye scanning patterns because of its demand for central 
executive resources.  
Thirdly, mind wandering is accompanied with changes in eye scanning patterns. 
Antrobus and colleagues found that the frequency of eye movements was positively 
associated with the rate of changes of cognitive content. Their study found that eye 
movements and blinks were more frequent under the instruction to engage in active 
than passive thinking, to suppress than to generate a wish, and to imagine moving 
than static visual imagery (Antrobus, Antrobus, & Singer, 1964). In the study of the 
effects of mind wandering on reading performance, eye movement behaviors were 
found to be impaired, with more blinks (Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010), longer 
fixation duration, and more erratic eye scanning patterns (Reichle, Reineberg, & 
Schooler, 2010). Proper eye scanning pattern is critical for driving safety. However, 
there has been no empirical effort to identify the link of eye movements when 
driving under mind wandering states versus attentive states.  
Moreover, studies of cognitive failures provide additional support for the idea 
that mind wandering will hinder driving. The frequency of cognitive failure, 
incidents in which people fail to maintain attention on ongoing activity (Cognitive 
Failure Questionnaire, CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982), is 
predictable of traffic accidents mishaps and hospital admissions (Larson, Anderton, 
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Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Larson & Merritt, 1991; Wickens, Toplak, & 
Wiesenthal, 2008;Allahyari et al., 2008). The CFQ scale is often used as a 
measurement of the propensity to mind wandering.  CFQ scores are predictive of 
both the self-reported frequency of mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009), and 
performance in Sustained Attention Response Task (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999). Similar 
to cognitive failure, when mind wandering, attention is diverted away from the 
primary tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Analogously, mind wandering would 
also predict accident rate as CFQ does, because of less attention devoted to driving. 
The study of Violanti and Marshall confirmed this speculation, by providing the 
evidence that drivers with higher accident risk are more likely to daydream or think 
about personal problems while driving (Violanti & Marshall, 1996) 
Despite evidence implying driving decrements when mind wandering, there is 
no direct verification of the effect of mind wandering on driving performance. 
Moreover, positive effects of mind wandering on driving, such as arousal 
maintenance during boring driving, were expected by some researchers (Antrobus, 
Singer, Goldsein, & Fortgang, 1970). Would mind wandering’s functions of 
planning and arousal maintenance make up for its demand on limited-capacity 
central executive resources? How and to what extent would mind wandering 
influence driving safety? This research is devoted to study the effects of mind 
wandering on driving behaviors and performance, in a high-fidelity driving 
simulator.  
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Measuring mind wandering 
In studies of physical or cognitive driver distraction, the researcher usually asks 
the participants to engage in a loading task, for example, using a cell phone or doing 
simple arithmetic calculations while driving. By comparing driver performance 
under dual task and the single-task conditions, the researcher can then evaluate the 
influence of distracting task. Mind wandering, as a self-activated thought, is more 
difficult to manipulate and measure in a controlled experiment. An experimenter 
cannot ask participants to mind wander naturally in the experiment, but can at best 
create conditions that encourage mind wandering prone task scenarios, for example, 
by asking participants to engage in simple, boring, and well-practiced tasks. There 
are two general methods that can be used to measure mind wandering, thought-
sampling and retrospective questioning (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
The thought sampling technique has two broad categories, probe-caught mind 
wandering and self-caught mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Schooler 
& Schreiber, 2004), differing in the way of sampling methods. The probe-caught 
method is modeled after the experience-sampling procedure (e.g., Hurlburt, 1993). 
Participants are given a probe at either random or quasi-random intervals, and are 
then asked to report their immediate mental content. The mental content can be 
classified as mind wandering or not by either the participant or by the experimenter. 
For example, Kane, Brown, McVay et al. (2007) used the probe-caught mind 
wandering paradigm to investigate the relationship between working memory 
capacity and mind wandering propensity in daily life. In their experiment, a personal 
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digital assistant signaled participants eight times daily to record their immediate 
thoughts, and their psychological and physical context.  
In the self-caught technique for detecting mind wandering, participants are 
asked to monitor and report their mental states whenever they find their thoughts 
wandering off the current task (e.g., Cunningham, Scerbo, & Freeman, 2000). The 
probe-caught and self-caught mind wandering techniques differ in the level of meta-
awareness they demand; the self-caught technique can only detect episodes of mind 
wandering that spontaneously enter meta-awareness, while the probe-caught mind 
wandering often catches off task thought before participants become meta-aware of 
them (Smallwood, et al., 2007).   
Some evidence suggested that people have little or no direct introspective access 
to higher order cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Recent research also 
suggests frequent mind wandering without awareness. If the participants were not 
probed, these instances of mind wandering would go without being noticed by 
participants. Therefore, it is necessary to test the validity of thought-sampling 
technique to study mind wandering. Nevertheless, an accumulating body of 
empirical research has substantiated the validity of self-reports of mind wandering. 
Self-report of mind wandering is associated with decrements in behavioral 
performance in a variety of tasks, for example, memory retrieval (Smallwood et al., 
2003), reading comprehension (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004), Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997).  
Self-report of mind wandering also shows accompanying physiological changes, as 
revealed by neuroscience research, using EEG (Cunningham et al., 2000) and fMRI 
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(Mason, et al., 2007), and measures of heart rate and galvanic skin response 
(Smallwood et al., 2004) . Mason and colleagues (2007), using the thought sampling 
technique and brain imaging, found that mind wandering is associated with activity 
in a default mode network of cortical regions. Importantly, self-report of mind 
wandering tendency was correlated with activity in the default network, which 
provides a direct neural signature of mind wandering, supporting the validity of the 
thought-sampling technique.  
Kane and colleagues used the thought-sampling technique to study how working 
memory influences mind wandering frequency in an executive control task (SART; 
a go/no-go task) in the laboratory (McVay & Kane, 2009). Afterwards, they studied 
the frequency of mind wandering in everyday life using the same group of subjects 
(McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). They found that participants whose mind 
wandered more frequently in the controlled laboratory study were more likely to 
report off-task thinking in daily life, supporting the ecological validity to study mind 
wandering using thought-sampling technique in the laboratory. 
Retrospective questionnaires, measure the frequency or contents of mind 
wandering during a recently completed task. Specific techniques include thought 
listing (Seibert & Ellis, 1991), the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003), the Thinking Content component of the Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire (Matthews, Joyner, Gililand, Campbell, & Faulconner, 1999), and the 
Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970). The retrospective 
approach does not require subjects’ response during the ongoing primary task, and 
therefore, is less intrusive than either the probe-caught and self-caught thought-
 14 
 
sampling technique. However, retrospective questionnaires have inherent limitations, 
and may confound with meta-cognition, memory and task performance. To track the 
frequency of mind wandering accurately, subjects need to monitor the allocation of 
attention consistently. Consider that attention may drift away from primary task 
without awareness; the retrospective approach may overlook these instances of mind 
wandering without awareness. Moreover, people are poor at memorizing detailed 
information about the past mental events, even for recent events (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Most importantly, questionnaires can measure the overall frequency of mind 
wandering, but cannot evaluate the influence of mind wandering on immediate task 
performance.   
 
Experiment goals 
The awareness of distraction may determine how and to what extent mind 
wandering impairs driving performance. In the commonly studied visual and 
cognitive distraction, for example, GPS, cell-phone use, and conversation with a 
passenger while driving, drivers are usually aware that they are multi-tasking, and 
these distracting tasks may impair their performance. To maintain driving safety, 
drivers could choose to engage in these distracting tasks when they are capable of 
doing, such as, before starting the car, or when the velocity is low. With awareness 
of ongoing distracting task, drivers could also make a compensatory adjustment, or 
be more alerted to a possible hazard. However, for mind wandering, which is a self-
activated and purely internal cognitive distraction; people are usually distracted by it 
without awareness (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004). Therefore, for driving, it 
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would be hard for drivers to choose a proper time to engage in this distracting task, 
and take necessary precautions.  
Considering the unconsciousness of some mind wandering and the prevalence of 
off-task thinking, mind wandering may incur more damage to driving safety than 
other external distraction. However, there is almost no research on how mind 
wandering influences driving in the scientific literature. The lack of research in this 
area is a result of the difficulty to track internal thoughts, and measure driving 
performance in real-time without endangering the drivers. In this study reported here, 
we utilized the self-caught thought-sampling technique to measure mind wandering, 
and examined the relationship between mind wandering and driving behaviors in a 
high-fidelity driving simulator.  
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METHODS 
 
Participants 
Nineteen participants (11 female and 8 male) were recruited through online 
advertisements and campus posters. The first subject was excluded from data 
analysis because of the technical failure to collect eye movement data. The ages of 
the participants ranged from 19 to 30 years, with a mean of 22 and standard 
deviation of 2.81. The mean self-reported driving distance per year of the 
participants was 6600 miles (range = 100 to 15000 miles). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants were each paid $8 per hour 
for a two-and-a-half hour experimental session. 
 
Apparatus 
 Data were collected in a fully immersive fixed-base driving simulator, 
consisting of a 1998 Saturn SL positioned in a wrap-around environment with 
135°forward and rear visual fields. Eight Epson Powerlite 703C projectors (1024 × 
768 pixels of resolution) projected the driving scenes onto separate screens. Road 
and traffic information is visible through the interior and exterior rear view mirrors.  
 The simulator control dynamics were modeled after a typical four-door Saturn 
sedan. Drive Safety’s Vection Simulation Software™ Version 1.6.1 (DriveSafety, 
2004) was used to display the virtual driving scenarios. The driving environments 
and traffic scenarios were created using HyperDrive Authoring Suite™ Version 
1.6.1. The wind turbulence, button and brake press events, and other environmental 
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features were coordinated through TCL programming scripts. Measures of real-time 
driving performance, including time stamp, velocity, headway distance, time to 
collision, trigger events, brake inputs, and accelerator pedal position etc., were 
sampled at 30 Hz and auto-recorded for later analysis during the execution of a 
simulated drive. 
 Eye and head movements were collected with a Smart Eye Pro 3.0 system 
(SmartEye AB, 2004).  This system consisted of three Sony XC HR50 
monochrome cameras, which were equipped with two IR-illuminators and mounted 
on the dashboard of the car. The cameras feed information into software that locates 
predefined characteristic points on the participant’s face, and in this way determines 
where the participant’s foveae are pointing. Data were analyzed with customized 
software. 
 
Experiment design 
The research used a 2 (no vs. high wind turbulence) × 2 (mental state: mind 
wandering vs. attentive) within-subject design. Each session included five blocks, 
with the first block for practice driving, and the following four blocks for test-
driving. No wind and high wind conditions were mixed within blocks, with 
sequence counter balanced across participants.  
 
Driving environment and task 
 As is shown in Figure 1, the simulated driving environment consisted of a 
straight, two-lane rural road about 12.4 miles in length with small hills on one side 
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and pasture, cattle, and houses on the other side of the road. There was no traffic in 
the opposing lane. The route included a 55 m/h speed limit which participants were 
required to obey. The driving environment was purposefully created to be dull in 
order to increase the number of mind wandering episodes (Kane, Brown, McVay, 
Silvia, Myin-Germeys, & Kwapil, 2007). The road was divided into two parts, one 
part without lateral wind, and the other part with heavy lateral wind. The sequence 
of the no and heavy wind segments was counter-balanced across drives. The 
participants did not know the sequence of the wind conditions, or the exact location 
where the wind turbulence would change. 
 The participant’s task was to maintain safe vehicle control, and follow the lead 
vehicle ahead (blue Grand Prix), and keep ahead of the following vehicle (red Grand 
Prix) in the same right-hand lane of the rural road. Participants were asked to keep a 
safe headway distance between their car and the lead car. During the drive, 
participants were told to keep their attention on the driving task as much as possible. 
However, if they found themselves zoning out, they were required to press a button 
on the steering wheel to report the mental states. To help them better understand the 
concept of “zone out”, the experimenter gave participants examples to help them 
differentiate “zone out” from normal driving. 
 
Procedure 
Screening. Upon arriving at the lab, drivers completed an informed consent form, a 
screening questionnaire inquiring their driving experience and propensity for 
simulator sickness, along with a demographic questionnaire. Drivers with at least 
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four years of driving experience, normal or corrected-to-normal vision ability, and 
no prior simulator sickness experience were allowed to participate in this experiment. 
Practice drive. Following camera calibration, participants were provided with a brief 
description of the experimental task. An example and definition of “zone-out” was 
also given to the participants to explain the concept. Participants then completed a 
practice drive to get used to the simulator and the driving environment. They were 
free to ask questions during the 10-minute practice drive session. 
Test drives. Main experimental blocks began after participants fully understood the 
task and were comfortable to drive in the simulator. During the test drives, 
participants need to drive while self-monitoring their mental states, and press a 
button on the steering wheel if they caught themselves mind wandering. Each 
participant completed four drive sessions, each lasting about fifteen minutes. Each 
drive session include both no wind and heavy wind conditions. Participants were 
given a chance to rest between blocks.  
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RESULTS 
 
Participants self-reported more episodes of mind wandering per 15-minute 
drive in no wind (M = 5.69) than in heavy wind (M = 3.72), t (17) = 3.668, p = 0.002. 
Thus, as expected, driving conditions that placed heavier demands on attention 
appeared to produce fewer episodes of mind wandering. 
Klinger (1978) estimated the median duration of each mind wandering 
episode to be 5s, and the mean duration to be 14s. Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & 
Handy (2008) adopted a 15 second time window for mind wandering in their study 
using the SART task. Therefore, the ten-second time window from -13 s to -4 s prior 
to each button press was designated as a mind wandering interval, and the window 
from 20 s to 29 s after the button press as an attentive interval. Intervals were limited 
to ten seconds duration to minimize the risk that analysis would extend beyond the 
onset of each mind wandering episode, and the window from -3 s to 0 s was 
excluded from analysis to avoid possible contamination from the demand to execute 
a button press when reporting a mind wandering episode. The window from 20 s to 
29 s post-report was chosen as the interval of attentive driving to eliminate the 
influence of potential corrective over-adjustments to their driving behavior that 
participants might make immediately upon emerging from mind wandering. This 
therefore represented a conservative test of the potential changes that occurred 
during mind wandering. Analyses using the interval from 4 s to 13 s post-report 
produced a pattern of results similar to that reported below. Analysis of data for a 
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pair of larger time windows (-30s to -4s for the mind wandering interval; 4s to 30s 
for the attentive intervals) also produced results similar to those reported. 
Driving performance measurements and eye scanning data were analyzed using 
a 2 × 2 within-subject ANOVA with mental state (mind wandering vs. attentive) and 
wind turbulence (no wind vs. heavy wind) as within-subject factors. Measures 
chosen for preliminary analysis were the mean and standard deviation of lane 
deviation, the mean and standard deviation of velocity, and the horizontal and 
vertical standard deviation of gaze position. Measures of lane position and velocity 
gauged the participants’ ability to monitor and control the vehicle laterally and 
longitudinally, while the horizontal and vertical standard deviation of the eye 
position measured how broadly participants distributed their visual attention. 
 
Lane position and variability 
 Analyses of average lane position and lane position variability gauged the 
influence of mind wandering on lateral vehicle control. The lane position is the 
offset, in meters, of the vehicle’s center from the center of the lane. Positive values 
indicate offset to the right of the lane, and negative values indicate offset to the left. 
Figure 2 shows mean lane position values. On average, offset values were positive, 
indicating that participants generally drove to the right of their lane. However, 
analysis revealed a highly reliable main effect of wind turbulence, (M = .013 m 
vs. .09 m) [F(1, 15) = 5.91, p = .028, η2partial = .28], and a marginally reliable effect 
of mental states, (M = .04 m during mind wandering intervals vs. .07 m during 
attentive intervals) [F(1, 15) = 3.14, p = .097, η2partial = .17], indicating that 
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participants drove farther to the right under heavy wind conditions than under no 
wind,and tended to drive further to the right when attentive than when mind 
wandering. Interaction effect was not significant, [F (1, 15) =0.397, p = .538, η
2
partial 
= .026].  
 Analysis of the variability of lane position produced a reliable main effect of 
wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =111.293, p < .001, η
2
partial = .881], but no reliable main 
effect of mental state, [F (1, 15) =.002, p = .967, η
2
partial = .000], and no reliable 
interaction, [F (1, 15) =.049, p =.828, η
2
partial = .003]. 
 
Car following performance 
Analyses of the mean and variability of velocity assessed the influence of 
mind wandering on longitudinal vehicle control. Analysis of mean velocity distance 
revealed no significant main effect of both wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =.577, p =.459, 
η2partial = .037], and mental state, [F (1, 15) =.025, p =.876, η
2
partial = .002], and no 
significant interaction[F (1, 15) =.028, p =.869, η
2
partial = .002]. The standard deviation 
of velocity showed a significant main effect of wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =17.696, p 
=.001, η2partial = .541], and also reliable main effect of mental states, [F (1, 15) =6.725, 
p =.020, η2partial = .310], but no interaction effect, [F (1, 15) =1.032, p =.326, η
2
partial 
= .064]. Analysis of accellerator position produced a similar pattern of effects. 
 To better understand the changes of the standard deviation of velocity, a 
spectral analysis of the velocity of the lead and subject vehicles (Brookhuis, De 
Waard, & Mulder, 1994) was carried out to compare drivers’ car following 
performance under attentive versus inattentive mental states. Spectral analysis 
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provides a fine-grained evaluation of drivers’ ability to adapt to the speed variation 
of the vehicle in the front, offering three independent measurements, including the 
coherence, the phase shift, and the modulus. Coherence, defined as the squared 
cross-correlation of subject and lead vehicle speed, measures the accuracy of 
drivers’ speed adaption. The score of coherence ranges from zero to one, with zero 
indicating no coherence between leading and subject vehicle speed, and one 
indicating perfect coherence. The phase shift measures the time delay of drivers to 
respond to the speed change of lead vehicle. A smaller phase shift value indicates 
better driving performance. Modulus, defined as the ratio of the speed gain of 
subject vehicle over the leading vehicle, measures the response amplification of 
drivers.  A modulus value larger than one indicates drivers overreacted to the speed 
change of lead vehicle, and a decimal value indicates under-reaction. Coherence, 
phase shift, and modulus measure the accuracy, time delay, and intensity of speed 
adjustment in response to lead vehicle variation, respectively.  
  Coherence, phase shift, and modulus were analyzed using separate 
ANOVAs, with mental state (mind wandering vs. attentive) and wind turbulence (no 
wind vs. heavy wind) as within-subject factors. See Figure 3 for the graph. 
Analysis of coherence revealed a significant main effect of mental state, (M 
= .907 for wandering mind vs. .941 for attentive mind) [F (1, 15) =1304.739, p < .001, 
η2partial = .989], suggesting more accuate speed adjustment in response to lead 
vehicle speed change when the drivers were attentive. However, the main effect of 
wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =2.110, p =.167, η
2
partial = .123], and the interaction effect, 
[F (1, 15) =1.217, p =.287, η
2
partial = .075], were not significant. 
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Analysis of phase shift did not yield any significant effects, all Fs < 1.0, 
ps > .10.  
Modulus values under four conditions were all smaller than one, suggesting 
that drivers were conservative in adjusting vehicle speed. Analysis of modulus 
revealed a significant main effect of mental state, (M = .909 for wandering mind 
vs. .938 for attentive mind) [F (1, 15) =22.948, p < .001, η
2
partial = .605], suggesting 
that drivers adapted speed to a better extent of the lead vehicle speed change when 
attentive. However, the main effect of wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) = .276, p =.607, 
η2partial = .018], and interact effect were not significant, [F (1, 15) =.945, p =.346, 
η2partial = .059]. 
Comparison of the intervals -13 to -4 seconds and 13 to 4 seconds produced 
no reliable effects in any measure, potentially suggesting that car following 
performance requires several seconds to recover following the end of a mind 
wandering interval.   
 
Vertical and horizontal deviation of gaze position 
Horizontal and vertical standard deviations of gaze position within the 
forward view of the scenario served as measures of participants’ spatial attentional 
allocation while driving. Horizontal and vertical deviation data were submitted to 
separate ANOVAs. Figure 4 shows the mean values of the standard deviation of 
horizontal eye positions. The main effect of wind turbulence was not significant, [F 
(1, 15) =.882, p =.362, η
2
partial = .056], nor was the interaction, [F (1, 15) =2.938, p =.107, 
η2partial = .164]. However, data showed a reliable main effect of mental state, (M 
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= .048 m for mind wandering vs. .058 m for attentive) [F (1, 15) =14.187, p =.002, 
η2partial = .486], indicating that the dispersion of the participants’ gaze was smaller 
during mind wandering than during attentive driving.  
Analysis of the vertical eye position revealed a significant main effect of 
wind turbulence, (M = .10 m for heavy wind vs. .08 m for no wind) [F (1, 15) =7.158, 
p =.017, η2partial = .323]. But neither the main effect of mental state, [F (1, 15) =.642, p 
=.435, η2partial = .041], nor the interaction effect was significant, [F (1, 15) =1.419, p 
=.352, η2partial = .086]. 
   The results above indicate that the horizontal distribution of visual attention 
narrowed during mind wandering. To examine this effect more closely, a further 
analysis assessed the frequency of the side mirror checks. 
Percent dwell time in the side mirrors 
Percent dwell time in the side mirrors is calculated as the percent of time 
during which the eyes fixate on the side mirrors.The percent dwell time in the side 
mirrors provides a measure of participants’ efforts to seek rear-view information. 
Left- and right-side checks were combined for analysis. Figure 5 shows the percent 
dwell time in the side mirrors per interval. ANOVA analysis shows no significant 
interaction effect of mental state by wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =.085, p =.775, η
2
partial 
= .006], and no main effect of wind turbulence, [F (1, 15) =.747, p =.401, η
2
partial 
= .047], but does reveal a significant main effect of mental state (M = 6.46 vs. 8.03) 
[F (1, 15) = 8.416, p = 0.011, η2partial = .359].  
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DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, subjects drove in a simulated driving scenario, while self- 
monitoring episodes of mind wandering. Mind wandering was accompanied by at 
least three changes in participants’ driving performance. Firstly, mindless drivers 
followed the velocity changes of the lead vehicle less carefully and under-
compensated the velocity change. Secondly, participants drove nearer to the center 
of their lane, and therefore nearer to the edge of the opposite lane. Thirdly, 
participants narrowed their visual attention, making fewer saccades among the 
forward view, the left and right mirrors, and rearview mirror and reducing the 
standard deviation of horizontal eye position by almost 10 percent. These data 
indicated higher driving risks when mind wandering. In the current experiment, the 
opposing lane was always free of traffic and the leading vehicle never braked 
suddenly, meaning that these changes were of no consequence to driver safety. 
Under normal circumstances, however, a leftward shift in lane position would bring 
the driver’s vehicle nearer to oncoming vehicles in the adjacent lane, reducing the 
driver’s margin of safety and potentially increasing the risk of collision. The leading 
vehicle may also brake or slow down unexpectedly, the under-compensation of 
leading vehicle velocity change would lead to longer braking time, possibly causing 
rear-end crash.  
Mind wandering appears to have effects similar to other forms of secondary task 
distraction, in terms of the eye scanning patterns. The dispersion of horizontal 
attention narrows, with the standard deviation of horizontal eye position shrinking 
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almost 10 percent when mind wandering. This result is similar to, though smaller 
than, an effect reported by Recarte and Nunes (2000). Such a narrowing of attention 
implies a potentially inflated risk of failure to detect road hazards while mind- 
wandering, and thus an inflated accident risk. Moreover, when the mind wanders, 
participants made fewer saccades among the forward view, the left and right mirror, 
and rearview mirror. This result corresponds to the effect of cognitive demanding 
task on driving. Similar to the effect of mind wandering, past work has found that 
cognitive distraction from a secondary task narrows drivers’ visual scanning 
(Brookhuis, de Vries, & de Waard, 1991; Recarte & Nunes, 2000, 2003; Victor, 
Harbluk, & Engström, 2005), reducing the horizontal dispersion of visual fixations 
and the frequency of mirror checks just as was observed during mind wandering in 
the current study.  
Despite similar effect on eye scanning patterns, mind wandering has 
different effects on lateral and longitudinal vehicle control from secondary-task 
distraction. Secondary-task distraction have often seems to have little effect on 
lateral vehicle control (Alm & Nilsson, 1995; Horrey & Wickens, 2006), and 
sometimes seems to engender safer control, reducing the variability of lateral 
position (Becic et al., 2010; Brookhuis et al., 1991; Kubose, et al., 2006) and 
shifting mean vehicle position away from oncoming traffic (Alm & Nilsson, 1994). 
Mind wandering, in contrast, was accompanied by a shift toward the oncoming lane. 
Conversely, secondary-task distraction can degrade longitudinal vehicle control 
(Kubose et al., 2006) and reduce headway margins (Alm & Nilsson, 1995). Mind 
wandering did incur changes in longitudinal vehicle control. Coherence analysis 
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showed that mindless drivers followed the leading vehicle less carefully, and tended 
to under-react to the velocity change of the leading vehicle, which may lead to 
lengthened response time to hazardous events. However, mind wandering appeared 
to entail little change in the mean or variability of headway distance between subject 
vehicle and a lead vehicle in this study. Was this result because mindless drivers did 
not compensate for cognitive distraction by increasing headway distance, or the 
limitation of current study? The presence of a trailing vehicle and fixed distance 
between the leading and trailing vehicle might have prevented the drivers’ 
compensation strategy. It is therefore interesting and important to validate the effects 
of mind wandering in the future, using a standard car following paradigm, by 
removing the trailing vehicle and sudden brake or slow-down of the leading vehicle. 
These effects suggest that mind wandering and secondary-task distractions 
may influence driver performance through mechanisms that are only partially 
overlapping. This conclusion accords with the observation, described above, that 
mind wandering and secondary-task distraction entails different forms of thought 
content (Smallwood et al., 2003), as well as the findings that mind wandering 
(Smallwood et al., 2008) and secondary-task driver distraction (Strayer & Drews, 
2007) affect the P300 in slightly different ways. Mind wandering was found to 
involve in both medial prefrontal default network regions and executive network 
(Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009), while distraction from a 
sentence listening task only caused less activity for the parietal and superior 
extrastriate(Just, Keller, & Cynkar, 2008).  
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Mind wandering and secondary-task distraction might also differ in the level 
of meta-cognitive awareness. Although drivers tend to underestimate the detrimental 
effects of secondary-task distraction on their behind-the-wheel performance (Horrey, 
Lesch, & Garrabet,2008, 2009; Lesch & Hancock, 2004; White, Eiser, & Harris, 
2004), they are clearly aware that they are engaging in a secondary-task when 
conversing on a cell phone or interacting with an in-vehicle information system. In 
contrast, a person may mind-wander for an extended time before noticing that his 
attention has drifted from the primary task (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 
2008). Secondary-task distraction may therefore allow compensatory behaviors or 
changes in task prioritization (Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Haigney, Taylor, & Westerman, 
2000). In contrast, for mind wandering without awareness, people lose supervisory 
control of the primary task, but during mind wandering with awareness, people still 
reserve some extent of task supervision (Smallwood, McSpadden &Schooler, 
2007).  In this study, subjects were asked to report their mental states as soon as 
they found themselves mind wandering. Therefore, the mind wandering instances 
captured in this study should be largely mind wandering without awareness, 
suggesting little likelihood of intentional compensatory behaviors to internal driving 
distraction. It is important to explore whether the availability of meta-cognitive 
awareness plays a role in the extent of driving decrement caused by cognitive 
distraction. A possible approach is to compare the influence of mind wandering with 
or without awareness on driving performance, using probe-caught mind wandering 
technique.  
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 In summary, this study indicates that mind wandering can alter driver 
performance in ways that are potentially dangerous. Mind wandering, as a kind of 
internal cognitive distraction, demonstrated to have similar effect on eye scanning 
patterns as other cognitive distraction, which was caused by secondary task (Recarte 
& Nunes, 2000, 2003). At the same time, however, results suggest that performance 
data and oculomotor scanning behavior may allow the detection of drivers’ mind 
wandering episodes before they are recognized by the driver him/herself, potentially 
providing interventions to detect inattentiveness and alert drivers (Liang et al., 2007). 
Further research will be necessary to test this possibility.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
 
(a). Perspective view 
 
(b). Orthographic view 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 36 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allahyari, T., Saraji, G. N., Adl, J., Hosseini, M., Iravani, M., Younesian, M., & Kass, 
S. J. (2008). Cognitive failures, driving errors and driving accidents. 
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics: JOSE, 14(2), 149-
158. 
Alm, H., & Nilsson, L. (1994). Changes in driver behaviour as a function of handsfree 
mobile phones-- A simulator study. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 26(4), 441-
451.  
Antrobus, J.S., Coleman, R., & Singer, J.L. (1967). Signal-detection performance by 
subjects differing in predisposition to daydreaming, Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 31, 487–491. 
Alm, H., & Nilsson, L. (1995). The effect of mobile telephone task on driver behavior 
in a car following situation. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 27(5), 707-715. 
Antrobus, J., Singer, J., & Greenber, S. (1966). Studies in the stream of 
consciousness: Experimental enhancement and suppression of spontaneous 
cognitive processes. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 23(2), 399- 417. 
Antrobus, J. S. (1968). Information theory and stimulus-independent thought. British 
Journal of Psychology, 59, 423-430. 
Antrobus, J. S., Antrobus, J. S., & Singer, J. L. (1964). Eye-movements 
accompanying daydreaming, visual-imagery, and thought suppression. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69(3), 244-252. 
 37 
 
Antrobus, J. S., Singer, J. L., Goldstein, S. ,& Fortgang, M. (1970). Mind wandering 
and cognitive structure, Transactions of the New York Academy of Science 
(Series II), 32, 242-252. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G.H. Bower (Ed.), The 
psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 8, 
pp. 47--89). New York: Academic Press. 
Becic, E., Dell, G. S., Bock, K., Garnsey, S. M., Kubose, T., & Kramer, A. F. (2010). 
Driving impairs talking. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(1), 15-21.  
Briem, V., & Hedman, L. R. (1995). Behavioural effects of mobile telephone use 
during simulated driving. Ergonomics, 38(12), 2536-2562. 
Broadbent, D. E., Cooper, P. F., FitzGerald, P., & Parkes, K. R. (1982). The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates. The British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology / the British Psychological Society, 21 (Pt 1), 1-16. 
Brookhuis, K. A., de Vries, G., & De Waard, D. (1991). The effects of mobile 
telephoning on driving performance. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 23(4), 309-
316. 
Brookhuis, K.A., De Waard, D., & Mulder, L.J.M. (1994). Measuring driving 
performance by car-following in traffic. Ergonomics, 37, 427-434. 
Brown, I. D., Tickner, A. H., & Simmonds, D. C. (1969). Interference between 
concurrent task of driving and telephoning. Journal of Applied Psychology, 53(5), 
419-424. 
 
 38 
 
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and 
its role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 
84(4), 822-848.  
Christoff, K., Ream, J., & Gabrieli, J. (2004). Neural basis of spontaneous thought 
processes. Cortex, 40(4-5), 623-630. 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). 
Experience sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system 
contributions to mind wandering. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 106(21), 8719-8724. 
Carriere, J. S. A., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2008). Everyday Attention Lapses and 
Memory Failures: The Affective Consequences of Mindlessness. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 17, 835–847. 
Cunningham, S., Scerbo, M. W., & Freeman, F. G. (2000). The electrocortical 
correlates of daydreaming during vigilance tasks. Journal of Mental Imagery, 
24(1-2), 61-72. 
DriveSafety. (2004). Company website. http://www.drivesafety.com 
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2009). Harnessing the wandering mind: The role of 
perceptual load. Cognition, 111(3), 345-355. 
Giambra, L. M. (1989). Task-unrelated thought frequency as a function of age – A 
laboratory study. Psychology and Aging, 4(2), 136-143. 
Giambra, L. M. (1993). The influence of aging on spontaneous shifts of attention 
from external stimuli to the contents of consciousness. Experimental 
Gerontology, 28(4-5), 485-492. 
 39 
 
Giambra, L. M., Rosenberg, E.H. , Kasper, S. , Yee W. , & Sack D.A. (1988–1989). A 
circadian rhythm in the frequency of spontaneous task-unrelated images and 
thoughts, Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 8, 307–312. 
Giambra, L. M. (1995). A laboratory method for investigating influences on switching 
attention to task-unrelated imagery and tought. Consciousness and Cognition, 
4(1), 1-21. 
Gold, S. R. and Reilly, J. P. III (1985±1986). Daydreaming, current concerns, and 
personality, Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 5, 117±115. 
Haigney, D., Taylor, R., & Westerman, S. (2000). Concurrent mobile (cellular) phone 
use and driving performance: Task demand characteristics and compensatory 
processes. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 
3(3), 113-121. 
Hanowski, R. J., Perez, M. A. , & Dingus, T. A. (2005). Driver distraction in long-
haul truck drivers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and 
Behavior, 8 (6), 441-458. 
Horrey, W. J., & Wickens, C. D. (2006). Examining the Impact of Cell Phone 
Conversations on Driving Using Meta-Analytic Techniques. Human Factors, 
48(1), 196-205.  
Horrey, W. J., Lesch, M. F., & Garabet, A. (2009). Dissociation between driving 
performance and drivers' subjective estimates of performance and workload in 
dual-task conditions. Journal of Safety Research, 40(1), 7-12. 
 
 
 40 
 
Horrey, W. J., Lesch, M. F., & Garabet, A. (2008). Assessing the awareness of 
performance decrements in distracted drivers. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 
40(2), 675-682. 
Hurlburt, R. T. (1993). Sampling inner experience in disturbed affect. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Just, M., Keller, T., & Cynkar, J. (2008). A decrease in brain activation associated 
with driving when listening to someone speak. Brain Research, 1205, 70-80. 
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. 
R. (2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when - An experience-sampling 
study of working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological 
Science, 18(7), 614-621. 
Klinger, E. (1977). Meaning and void: Inner experience and the incentives in people's 
lives. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Klinger, E. (1978). Modes of normal conscious flow. In K. S. Pope & J. L. Singer 
(Eds.), The stream of consciousness: Scientific investigations into the flow of 
human experience (pp. 225–258). New York:Plenum. 
Klinger, E. C. (1999). Thought flow: Properties and mechanisms underlying shifts in 
content. In J. A. Singer & P. Salovey (Eds.), At play in the fields of consciousness: 
Essays in the honour of Jerome L. Singer (pp.29–50). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Klinger, E. (2009). Daydreaming and fantasizing: Thought flow and motivation.In K. 
D. Markman, W. M. P. Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.),Handbook of imagination and 
mental simulation (pp. 225–239). NewYork, NY: Psychology Press. 
 
 41 
 
Klos, D. S. and Singer, J. L. (1981). Determinants of the adolescent's ongoing thought 
following simulated parental confrontations, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 41, 975-987. 
Kubose, T., Bock, K., Dell, G., Garnsey, S., Kramer, A., & Mayhugh, J. (2006). The 
effects of speech production and speech comprehension on simulated driving 
performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 43-63. 
Larson, G. E., Alderton, D. L., Neideffer, M., & Underhill, E. (1997). Further 
evidence on dimensionality and correlates of the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire. British Journal of Psychology, 88(1), 29-38.  
Larson, G. E., & Merritt, C. R. (1991). Can Accidents be predicted? An empirical test 
of the cognitive failures questionnaire. Applied Psychology, 40(1), 37-45.  
Lesch, M. F., & Hancock, P. A. (2004). Driving performance during concurrent cell-
phone use: are drivers aware of their performance decrements? Accident Analysis 
& Prevention, 36(3), 471. 
Liang, Y. L., Reyes, M. L., & Lee, J. D. (2007). Real-time detection of driver 
cognitive distraction using support vector machines. IEEE Transactions on 
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 8, 340-350. 
Manly, T., Robertson, I. H., Galloway, M., & Hawkins, K. (1999). The absent mind: 
further investigations of sustained attention to response. Neuropsychologia, 
37(6), 661-670. 
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & 
Macrae, C. N. (2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-
independent thought. Science, 315(5810), 393-395. 
 42 
 
Matthews, G., Joyner, L., Gililand, K., Campbell, S. E., & Faulconner, S. (1999). 
Validation of a comprehensive stress state questionnaire: Towards a state “Big 
three”? In I. Mervielde, I. J. Deary, F. De Fruyt, & F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Handbook 
of coping: Theory, research and applications. 
McKnight, A. J., & McKnight, A. S. (1993). The effect of cellular phone use upon 
driver attention. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 25(3), 259-265. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: Working 
memory capacity, goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control task. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 35(1), 
196-204. 
McVay, J. C., Kane, M. J., & Kwapil, T. R. (2009). Tracking the train of thought from 
the laboratory into everyday life: An experience-sampling study of mind 
wandering across controlled and ecological contexts. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 16(5), 857-863. 
Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259. 
Recarte, M. A., & Nunes, L. M. (2000). Effects of verbal and spatial-imagery tasks on 
eye fixations while driving. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Applied, 6(1), 
31-43. 
Recarte, M. A., & Nunes, L. M. (2003). Mental workload while driving: Effects on 
visual search, discrimination, and decision making. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Applied, 9(2), 119-137. 
 43 
 
Reichle, E. D., Reineberg, A. E., & Schooler, J. W. (2010). An eye-movement study 
of mindless reading. Psychological Science. Manuscript in press. 
Robertson, I. H. (2003). The absent mind: Attention and error. 2003 Annual 
Conference – Now pay attention, 476-479. 
Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Andrade, J., Baddeley, B. T., &Yiend, J. (1997). “Oops!” 
Performance correlates of everyday attentional failures in traumatic brain injured 
and normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 35, 747-758. 
Schacter, D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and 
remembers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between 
experience and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(8), 339-344. 
Schooler, J. W., Reichle, E. D., & Halpern, D. V. (2005). Zoning-out during reading: 
Evidence for dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. In Levin 
D. T. (Ed.), Thinking and seeing: Visual metacognition in adults and children (pp. 
203-226). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Schooler, J. W., & Schreiber, C. A. (2004). Experience, meta-consciousness, and the 
paradox of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(7-8), 17-39. 
Seibert, P., & Ellis, H. (1991). Irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states and 
cognitive performance. Memory & Cognition, 19(5), 507-513. 
Singer, J.L. and J.S. Antrobus (1970). Manual for the imaginal Processes Inventory. 
Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service . 
 44 
 
Singer, J. L., & Antrobus, J. S. (1963). A factor analytic study of daydreaming and 
conceptually-related cognitive and personality variables. Perceptual & Motor 
Skills.Monograph Supplement, 3V-II7. 
Singer, J. L., & Antrobus, J. S. (1972). Daydreaming, imaginal process and 
personality: A normative study. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature 
of imagery. Academic Press, New York. 
Smallwood, J. M., Baracaia, S. F., Lowe, M., & Obonsawin, M. (2003). Task 
unrelated thought whilst encoding information. Consciousness and Cognition, 
12(3), 452-484. 
Smallwood, J., Beach, E., Schooler, J. W., & Handy, T. C. (2008). Going AWOL in 
the brain: Mind wandering reduces cortical analysis of external events. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(3), 458-469. 
Smallwood, J., Davies, J. B., Heim, D., Finnigan, F., Sudberry, M., O'Connor, R., et 
al. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional lapse: Task engagement and 
disengagement during sustained attention. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4), 
657-690. 
Smallwood J., Fishman D. J., & Schooler, J. W. (2007). Counting the cost of an 
absent mind: Mind wandering as an under-recognized influence on educational 
performance. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(2), 230-236. 
Smallwood, J., Fitzgerald, A., Miles, L. K., & Phillips, L. H. (2009). Shifting Moods, 
Wandering Minds: Negative Moods Lead the Mind to Wander. Emotion, 9(2), 
271-276. 
 
 45 
 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2007). The lights are on but no 
one's home: Meta-awareness and the decoupling of attention when the mind 
wanders. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(3), 527-533. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). When attention matters: 
The curious incident of the wandering mind. Memory & Cognition, 36(6), 1144-
1150. 
Smallwood, J., Obonsawin, M., & Heim, D. (2003). Task unrelated thought: The role 
of distributed processing. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(2), 169-189. 
Smallwood, J., O'Connor, R. C., Sudberry, M. V., Haskell, C., & Ballantyne, C. 
(2004). The consequences of encoding information on the maintenance of 
internally generated images and thoughts: the role of meaning complexes. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4), 789-820.  
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 
132(6), 946-958. 
SmartEye AB (2004). Company website. http://www.smarteye.se 
Smilek,D., Carriere,J.S.,Cheyne, J.A. (2010). Out of mind, out of sight: Eye blinking 
as indicator and embodiment of mind wandering. Psychological Science, 
21(6):785-789. 
Strayer, D. L., & Johnston, W. A. (2001). Driven to distraction: Dual-task studies of 
simulated driving and conversing on a cellular telephone. Psychological Science, 
12(6), 462-466. 
Strayer, D. L., & Drews, F. A. (2007). Cell-phone-induced driver distraction. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 16(3), 128-131. 
 46 
 
Strayer, D. L., Drews, F. A., & Crouch, D. J. (2006). A comparison of the cell phone 
driver and the drunk driver. Human Factors, 48(2), 381-391. 
Stutts, J. C., Reinfurt, D. W., Staplin, L.,& Rodgman, E. A. (2001).The role of driver 
distraction in traffic. AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety crashes. Retrieved 
February 2, 2009, from http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/distraction.pdf 
Sussman, E. D., Bishop, H., Madnick, B., & Walter, R. (1985). Driver inattention and 
highway safety. Transportation Research Record, 1047, 40–48. 
Teasdale, J. D., Dritschel, B. H., Taylor, M. J., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A., Nimmosmith, 
I., et al. (1995). Stimulus-independent thought depends on central execuive 
resources. Memory & Cognition, 23(5), 551-559. 
Treat, J. R., Tumbas, N. S., McDonald, S. T., Shinar, D., Hume, R. D., Mayer, R. E., 
Stansifer, R. L., & Catellan, N. J. (1979). Tri-level study of the causes of traffic 
accidents: Final report Volume I: Causal factor tabulations and assessments. 
Institute for Research in Public Safety, Indiana University, DOT HS-805 085. 
Victor, T. W., Harbluk, J. L., & Engström, J. A. (2005). Sensitivity of eye-movement 
measures to in-vehicle task difficulty. Transportation Research: Part F, 8(2), 
167-190. 
Violanti, J. M., & Marshall, J. R. (1996). Cellular phones and traffic accidents: An 
epidemiological approach. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 28(2), 265-270. 
Wang, J.-S., Knipling, R. R., & Goodman, M. J. (1996). The role of driver inattention 
in crashes: New statistics from the 1995 Crashworthiness Data System. 40th 
Annual Proceedings of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive 
Medicine, 377–392. 
 47 
 
Wickens, C. M., Toplak, M. E., & Wiesenthal, D. L. (2008). Cognitive failures as 
predictors of driving errors, lapses, and violations. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 40(3), 1223-1233. 
White, M., Eiser, J., & Harris, P. (2004). Risk perceptions of mobile phone use while 
driving. Risk Analysis, 24(2), 323-334. 
 
